Abstract: Aggregate art price patterns mask a lot of underlying variation-both in the time series and in the cross-section. We argue that, to increase our understanding of the market for aesthetics, it is helpful to take a micro perspective on the formation of art prices, and acknowledge that each artwork gives rise to a market for trading in its private-value benefits. We discuss relevant recent literature, and illustrate the potential of this approach through a historical study of record prices for art at auction since 1701. JEL classification codes: D10; D44; D84; G10; Z11.
I. Introduction
Over the last half century, a growing literature in economics has substantially improved our knowledge of the risk-return properties of diversified art portfolios, the correlation patterns between artwork characteristics and prices, and the impact of shifts in income and wealth distributions-and in market sentiment-on average art prices. These quantitative, econometric studies have been useful in documenting the integration of the market for art into a broader economic and social context, but this framework of analysis also has its limits. Focusing on the aggregate time-series dynamics and average cross-sectional pricing differences masks considerable idiosyncratic variation that is peculiar to the demand and appreciation of art, and is potentially highly relevant to economists seeking to understand how prices are set, to (typically undiversified) collector-investors, and to observers of the art market wishing to learn about the dynamics of art buyers' preferences from prices.
In this article, we propose that, to further increase our economic understanding of the market for aesthetics, it is useful to examine the formation of art prices on a disaggregate level-using cases that elucidate the complexity of price formation. In a market characterized by private values, idiosyncratic tastes, and non-pecuniary benefits of ownership and display, sometimes the details can be as useful as the statistics in revealing fundamental market determinants. In econometric terms, a deeper understanding of outliers can reveal factors that would otherwise be difficult to capture through standard aggregate measures.
Our starting point is that anybody's valuation of an artwork should be a function of both the expected (non-financial) private-value benefits over the holding period and the expected (financial) resale revenues (Lovo and Spaenjers, 2014) . The latter cashflow is in itself endogenously related to the distribution of tastes among potential buyers at the time of resale. Each individual artwork thus gives rise to a market for trading in its current and future private-value benefits. Within this framework, we discuss recent theoretical and empirical studies on the different forces that drive bidders' willingness to
II. Main Strands of the Literature on Art Prices

II.1. Art price indexes
The first efforts to estimate the investment performance of art occurred in the early 1960s. A popular book by Rush (1961) presented indices for different artistic genres and even included a comparison with stocks. Early efforts to estimate the investment performance of art were hindered by difficulties in collecting price data (Coslor and Spaenjers, 2013) . Academic interest in the topic grew with a number of contributions (e.g., Anderson, 1974; Baumol, 1986; Goetzmann, 1993) that used historical auction sales data compiled by art historian Gerard Reitlinger (1961) in his influential book "The Economics of Taste: The Rise and Fall of Picture Prices, 1760-1960". A popular methodology used to construct price indexes for infrequently traded assets in these early studies was the repeat-sales regression, which estimates average returns based on purchase and sale prices of items trading twice. An alternative approach is the hedonic regression, which constructs a price index by regressing all available transaction prices-so not only those of sales pairs-against time dummies, controlling for the qualitydetermining or "utility-bearing" (Rosen, 1974) characteristics of each artwork. Over the last two decades, researchers have applied these two methods to ever-larger databases of art auction sales. For example, Mei and Moses (2002) build a price index starting in 1875, based on resales at the New York offices of Sotheby's and Christie's. Goetzmann, Renneboog, and Spaenjers (2011) do a similar longterm exercise using London auction data from Reitlinger (1961) and an online sales database. Other papers (e.g., Renneboog and Spaenjers, 2013) consider shorter time intervals but use data from a wider set of auction houses and locations.
Although different methodologies and sample periods yield slightly different conclusions with respect to the long-term return to art investment, estimated returns generally beat inflation but remain below the performance of equities. To illustrate this, Figure 1 compares the real GBP investment performance of art to that of financial assets between start-1900 and end-2013. For the period 1900-2007, we rely on estimates of price changes in the U.K. art market from Goetzmann, Renneboog, and Spaenjers (2011) . 1 We link the resulting series to six years of returns from Artprice.com (2014) . Figure 1 also shows returns on U.K. Treasury bills, government bonds, and equities, using data from Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2002, 2014) . Art outperformed bonds-mainly because of a strong performance over the second half of the time frame-but significantly underperformed equities. Table 1 compares mean returns and standard deviations for all four assets. The annualized real return (standard deviation)
for art over the full 113-year time period is 2.3% (15.2%), compared to 5.3% (19.8%) for equities.
[Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 about here]
Much research looks into the returns to oil paintings sold in important art market centers, but some studies construct indexes for particular media, art movements, quality categories, artist nationalities, or countries of sale. A full review of the existing literature goes beyond the scope of our paper, but two findings of this body of work are that, at least over the last half century, more expensive categories of art have outperformed other types of art, and that "younger" (e.g., contemporary) art typically combines higher returns with higher volatility (e.g., Renneboog and Spaenjers, 2013) . Such crosssectional variation in returns enables further examination of the relation between economic fundamentals and prices (cf. Section III).
A number of methodological issues with price index estimates have not yet been completely resolved.
For example, there is the issue of endogeneity of trading. Items may only (re)sell if they have gone up in value (Goetzmann, 1996) ; Korteweg, Kräussl, and Verwijmeren (2015) study such survivorship bias and find that standard repeat-sales art price indexes may have to be adjusted downwards. However, the extent to which hedonic regression coefficients or even longer-term repeat-sales return estimates are 1 In this paper, we report returns after unsmoothing the repeat-sales regression coefficients of Goetzmann, Renneboog, and Spaenjers (2011) , because averaging prices over intervals induces spurious first-order autocorrelation (Working, 1960) . The resulting standard deviation presents a conservative (i.e., high) estimate of the volatility of art investment. Measures of risk based on repeat-sales regression indexes are subject to upward bias due to small-sample issues (Goetzmann, 1992) .
biased is still unclear. For example, Lovo and Spaenjers (2014) (2015) follow the estimated value of a complete art collection-the one put together by the economist John Maynard Keynes-over time, and find a performance over the last half century very similar to that shown by an auction-based art price index. Another issue is that of buy-ins. Goetzmann and Peng (2006) show how the existence of reservation prices may lead price indexes to underestimate (overestimate) true returns when the market is doing surprisingly well (badly), leading to an underestimation of volatility.
II.2. Hedonic pricing
Hedonic regressions do not only enable the construction of price indexes, but they also allow some insight into the price-determining characteristics of artworks. Hedonic models estimated in art price studies typically include easily quantifiable characteristics of the artist (e.g, artist dummies and/or reputation measures) and the work (e.g., size, medium, strength of attribution). The regression results then show the implicit "premia"-and thus the average willingness to pay among art buyersassociated with certain characteristics. (Hedonic models often also include characteristics of the sale (e.g, auction house, month of sale), which are supposed to pick up otherwise unobservable differences in quality.) For example, Renneboog and Spaenjers (2013) find that works that are "attributed to" an artist are on average 52% cheaper than works that are certainly by the artist; the authors also quantify the premia that art buyers are paying on average for oil paintings, signed works of art, self-portraits, etc. Other studies have focused on more subtle variations in hedonic pleasure. For example, Lazzaro (2006) uses hedonic regressions to quantify the differences in utility from owning an original versus a posthumous Rembrandt print, and Pownall (2014) shows that artworks with darker colours carry a premium relative to objects with a lower colour intensity.
II.3. Determinants of art market returns
An artwork is essentially a claim on the pleasure and pride experienced as its owner. As the "consumption" of art is discretionary, the marginal utility of-and therefore the willingness to pay for-its non-pecuniary payoffs can be expected to vary with wealth shocks (Aït-Sahalia, Parker, and Yogo, 2004) . Table 1 shows a positive contemporaneous correlation of real art and equity returns. We also show the aggregated slope coefficient (Dimson, 1979 ) of a regression of art returns against both lagged and same-year equity returns, as it may take time before changes in equity wealth are reflected in art prices. This equity market "beta" equals 0.44.
Art price indexes also typically drop in recessionary periods. For example, the art index in Figure 1 shows annualized real returns of -19.8% in 1919-1920, -31.4% in 1930-1931, -15.5% in 1974-1975, -24.1% in 1991, and -21.9% in 2008 . Table 1 shows a positive covariance of art returns with GDP growth rates that is statistically significant at the 0.10 level. Yet, as masterpieces are unique and indivisible goods that are in excess demand, the number and the buying power of wealthy households may be more relevant in determining the price of high-end art than the average wealth across all households-just like for real estate in "superstar cities" (Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai, 2013) . Goetzmann, Renneboog, and Spaenjers (2011) indeed find evidence of a long-run relationship between high-end art prices and top incomes.
Not only fundamental drivers of luxury consumption demand may affect the willingness to pay for art.
Art price indexes typically show bubble-like behavior (e.g., Kräussl, Lehnert, and Martelin, 2014) , such as short-term persistence and longer-term reversion. Moreover, returns and volume changes tend to be positively correlated. The absence of short-selling in the art market-coupled with the limited amount of artworks for sale in each period-facilitates the emergence of bubbles (e.g., Haruvy and Noussair, 2006) . Renneboog and Spaenjers (2013) show that high-income consumer confidence and art buyer sentiment indeed predict art returns. Moreover, differences of opinion about the future of the market may encourage relatively pessimistic art owners to sell to optimists in bubble periods , in the spirit of, for example, Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) . Yet, it should be noted that-like in any market-bubbles can be hard to detect, and that some of the observed timeseries patterns in prices and volume could be explained in other ways. For example, a positive pricevolume correlation may also arise if art owners suffer from nominal loss aversion (Genesove and Mayer, 2001; , or if changes in the bidding population (rationally) affect prices and sale decisions simultaneously (Lovo and Spaenjers, 2014) .
III. New Perspectives on Art Prices
The literature has painted a clear picture of the aggregate historical price dynamics in the art market, and of the covariance of the price of an "average" artwork with changes in other economic variables.
This work is important, because it allows one to compare the risk-return profile of art as an asset class-or of a certain type of art-with those of other investments, and to evaluate the potential role of diversified art collections-or even art investment funds-in a portfolio. Reviewing the available evidence, Dimson and Spaenjers (2014) write that, from a pure financial perspective, an investment in art or other collectibles may only be interesting to "investors who already have a diversified portfolio of financial assets, who have a long investment horizon, and who can sit out periods of high illiquidity and low demand for luxury consumption". This conclusion may not be surprising, as one could expect the non-pecuniary benefits of holding collectibles to depress expected financial returns in equilibrium (Mandel, 2009; Jovanovic, 2013; de Roon, Koedijk, and Pownall, 2014; Lovo and Spaenjers, 2014) .
At the same time, however, it should be recognized that price indexes hide a lot of variation, and may not be representative of the price dynamics for any individual artist or artwork. We can get a sense of how much of the variation in art prices is systematic by looking at the R-squareds of repeat-sales regressions. Goetzmann (1993) and Mei and Moses (2002) report that their indexes explain 0.59 and 0.64 of the sample return variation, respectively; the R-squared can be expected to be lower in more heterogeneous samples than theirs. 2 Art price indexes thus leave a substantial part of the returns on individual objects unexplained, which is especially relevant as many collector-investors-by choice or by lack of investable capital-focus on a very small of artists and thus tend to be undiversified. We argue that, to increase the economic understanding of the auction market for aesthetics, it is useful to go beyond average price dynamics, and acknowledge that a separate "market" is associated with each individual artwork.
We can build on Lovo and Spaenjers (2014) to formalize this idea. The authors define an "emotional dividend" as the amount an individual is willing and able to pay for each period of ownership of an artwork; it is the quantitative counterpart of the non-financial utility associated with being an art owner. Any individual i's valuation of an artwork then equals the present value of the emotional dividends expected between purchase and resale, plus the present value of the expected auction proceeds-net of transaction costs-at resale:
where t is the time of purchase and t' is the optimal time of resale. 3 The magnitude of the emotional dividend per period-which determines the first (non-financial, private-value) component in equation
(1)-depends both on individual i's preferences and on his financial wealth. The expected resale revenues-which determine the second (financial, common-value) component in equation (1)-are endogenous to the distribution of emotional dividends in the population of bidders at time t': the resale price can be expected to be higher if more individuals derive high enjoyment from the work. This element of the time-t valuation should be the same for all non-financially-constrained bidders planning to resell at t'.
Even if hedonic models do rather well in explaining average cross-sectional price differences between artworks, they mask variation in the nature of emotional dividends or private use values that exist for each individual work. Furthermore, the structure of patterns of tastes and wealth-which together determine the distribution of these emotional dividends-across potential art buyers may change over time. These dynamics do not only affect returns through the private-value component of art valuations; expectations about future market conditions for an artwork have an impact on prices through the common-value component as well. Finally, the strategic choices made by the auction house prior to the sale can also affect the sale price. In the following paragraphs, we show how recent literature has explored these issues.
III.1. The nature of emotional dividends
The preferences underpinning the non-financial utility that individuals derive from owning an artwork can take different forms. There is of course the viewing pleasure, and the admiration of artistic skill or genius. But duplicates are not worth as much as original artworks: price differences exist between works with different strengths of attribution to artists (Lazzaro, 2006; Renneboog and Spaenjers, 2013) . Newman and Bloom (2012) argue that two psychological mechanisms can explain such findings: they find that both "the assessment of the art object as a unique creative act (performance) and the degree of physical contact with the original artist (contagion)" have an effect on people's valuations.
A subtle twist is that the pride and enjoyment associated with ownership may be much stronger than the pleasure experienced by art lovers when viewing art that they like but is not theirs. Frey and Eichenberger (1995) argue that "an art object yields additional benefits if it is owned (and not just rented) because the art object's 'aura' is therewith appropriated". The importance of such ownership effects-which may be entirely foreseeable by potential art buyers, and therefore come on top of the standard endowment effect (Thaler, 1980) -could explain the absence of a well-developed art rental market.
Art buyers may not only be paying for the personal satisfaction of ownership; social signaling may also play a role. Heffetz (2011) shows that there is a relation between the visibility of expenditures on a category of goods and the elasticity of consumption with respect to income. Public perceptions of one's tastes may determine social status (Bernheim, 1994) . In this view, an art collector's intrinsic preferences are not necessarily aligned with common tastes, but the collector conforms to a homogeneous standard of behavior due to status concerns.
The durability of art makes it not only a consumption good, but also a store and display of wealth. If wealth provides social status, then it may directly enter into the utility function of economic agents. In the presence of such a "capitalist spirit" (e.g., Bakshi and Chen, 1996) , the wealthy may pay a premium for art relative to the stream of consumption services that is inherent to the artwork (Satchell and Srivastava, 2014) . Mandel (2009) constructs an asset pricing model that incorporates a conspicuous utility dividend that is a function of the art's price, introducing a relation between the private-value and the common-value components of an artwork's value.
Also social competition within the walls of the auction room may be important. Auction participants may get utility from winning for winning's sake-to be the "top dog" (Shogren and Hayes, 1997) .
Even if the experimental evidence for such an effect is limited (Holt and Sherman, 1994; Shogren and Hayes, 1997) , it could play a more important role when members of the global elite are competing for a trophy item.
The observations that ownership is a condition for complete hedonic enjoyment and that the need for social recognition may impact bidding behavior also suggest an important role for supply in the determination of prices. We can define supply as the number of artworks of an artist that is still in private hands. Supply typically shrinks over time, as museums continue to acquire items but only rarely de-accession. Moreover, there is the issue of re-attributions. For many Old Masters, the number of works that are considered to be executed by the master has decreased historically as attention to authenticity heightened and technology advanced; Seinstra (2014) shows how the number of paintings included in various Rembrandt "oeuvre catalogues" more or less halved over the twentieth century. 4 If supply is severely constrained, bidders may be faced with their one and only opportunity to acquire an item by a certain artist if it comes up for sale, reinforcing the idea that an auction can indeed be "won", and inducing exceptionally high demand.
The above discussion makes clear that the emotional dividends from acquiring and owning an artwork-which underlie its price-can take many forms. Whether hedonic regression models are able to explain cross-sectional price variation between art objects depends crucially on whether the included variables capture these private-value-determining features and on the (absence of) idiosyncratic variation around average preferences.
III.2. Time-series variation in the distribution of emotional dividends
Aggregate art price indexes will capture the price dynamics of individual artists or works more accurately if there is a substantial systematic component in how emotional dividends change over time.
There will be less variation in price changes around the average trend if preferences are relatively stable over time. While the multi-dimensional nature of preferences for artworks makes this hard to evaluate-for example, how does the demand for conspicuous consumption change over time, and how does this differentially affect the demand for each artwork?-recent research suggests that there is at least a strong endurance in the relative popularity of leading artists, even over longer time frames (Ginsburgh and Weyers, 2010; Graddy, 2013; Vermeylen, van Dijck, and De Laet, 2013) . Of course, the degree to which different movements or mediums are in fashion may still be changing slowly over time. Moreover, changing wealth patterns may make certain groups of individuals' preferences more or less impactful. Therefore, while the correlation between the aggregate movements of global wealth and art prices is interesting, the interaction between regional wealth patterns and local cultural tastes certainly deserves as much attention. Saltzman (2009) documents "America's raid on Europe's great pictures" in the early twentieth century; art dealer Joseph Duveen famously commented that "Europe has a great deal of art, and America has a great deal of money". Hiraki et al. (2009) find a strong correlation between the demand for art by Japanese collectors and Japanese stock prices, leading to an increase in Impressionist and Post-Impressionist art prices during the late 1980s bubble period in the Japanese economy. More recently, art from emerging economies has appreciated in value strongly (Kräussl and Logher, 2010; Renneboog and Spaenjers, 2011; Velthuis and Baia Curioni, 2015) . In line with these findings, Renneboog and Spaenjers (2015) show that national equity markets help explaining country-specific art returns, but become irrelevant for the artists with the highest reputations.
III.3. Beliefs about the common-value component
Rationally-behaving art owners will only want to resell when the expected auction proceeds exceed the (individual-specific) value of continued ownership. Under certain conditions, increases in price levels in the art market may thus trigger increases in the volume of consignments to auction houses. One factor that will directly impact expected auction proceeds is a change in the number of bidders in the market (Goetzmann and Spiegel, 1995; Lovo and Spaenjers, 2014) . If there is uncertainty about what the shape of the (future) distribution of private-value benefits-which determines the common-value component-looks like, then also changes in the beliefs about this distribution should impact the valuation of an artwork. Using survey data, Pénasse, Renneboog, and Spaenjers (2014) find that, in the cross-section, optimistic beliefs in the market outlook for specific artists are correlated with higher prices. Renneboog and Spaenjers (2013) show that art buyer sentiment is more highly correlated with price changes for modern and contemporary art, for which uncertainty about future tastes is likely to be higher. Beggs and Graddy (2008) show downward price trends after buy-ins (i.e., items failing to reach the reserve price), which can be explained by common-value effects.
III.4. Auctions and auction house strategies
Ashenfelter and Graddy (2003) Third, the auctioneer will decide on the ordering of lots for sale. Beggs and Graddy (1997) show that more expensive artworks are typically auctioned off first, and that sale premiums (relative to the presale estimate) on average decline as an auction progresses. Hong et al. (2015) examine the effect of ordering on revenues, using the predetermined rotation of Sotheby's and Christie's during auction weeks in New York. They find that total revenues are higher if the auction with the most valuable items is held first, and attribute this result to anchoring effects (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) Fourth, and finally, auction houses have over the last decades become more innovative in the financial services that they provide to both buyers and sellers. For example, they started offering credit to potential buyers in the 1980s-a controversial move at the time (Lacey, 1998; Coslor and Spaenjers, 2013 ) that may have pushed up prices in some cases by alleviating bidders' credit constraints. More recently, auction houses have also started guaranteeing minimum prices to sellers of high-end works.
Graddy and Hamilton (2014) explore how such (in-house or outside) guarantees can change the bidding environment-for example through the signal that they send on the potential market for the item-and thus affect sale prices.
IV. Art at Auction: A Record of Records
On 12 November 2013, the Francis Bacon triptych "Three Studies of Lucian Freud" was sold at
Christie's New York for 127 million USD, or almost 90 million GBP-a world record price for a work of art at auction. In this section, we construct a long-term history of such record prices, going back to the start of the eighteenth century. 5 In Section V, we will discuss how our new data series illustrates the relevance of going beyond studying aggregate price patterns, and taking a disaggregated perspective on the formation of art prices.
We believe that the history of record-breaking auction transactions forms a particularly interesting case study of art price formation. Record sales are typically covered extensively by the popular press, and often trigger a debate about what paintings are really "worth". Artworks that broke records can be considered as the ultimate luxury goods, and their prices as a measure of the maximum willingness to pay for cultural objects.
IV.1. Defining and identifying records
We use the following criteria to identify art auction record prices. 6 First, we only consider artworks (created by an identifiable artist), so no books, jewelry, etc. We exclude lots in which multiple artworks are pooled together. Second, the work needs to be traded at a public auction. Moreover, we only consider the highest price from each auction: if a record gets broken within the same sale, we exclude it from the list, as such transactions were arguably never reported or remembered as recordbreaking. Third, at the auction the work needs to be acquired by a party other than the consignor. In other words, we consider record-breaking reserve prices as irrelevant. Fourth, we consider prices including auction house transactions costs payable by the winning bidder, as we want to capture the total sum laid out by the acquirer. Christie's and Sotheby's introduced a buyer's premium in the 1970s, but other auction houses already had buyer's fees in place before. (However, we do not consider VAT and other taxes.) Fifth, it is clear that the currency perspective may matter. Because the global art market for a very long time was centered in London, we take a GBP perspective. New York only became an important trading place for art in the twentieth century.
Even starting from such clear guidelines, the identification of record-breaking transactions in the history of the art auction market is difficult. Although online art auction databases have good coverage going back until the 1960s at least, no exhaustive online or offline database exists for older auctions.
However, throughout history, a number of different "repertoires" listing art auction sales have been published. The starting point of our research is Reitlinger (1961) , which lists for a wide range of artists a history of prices, including some eighteenth-century ones starting in 1701. However, closer examination of the highest prices in Reitlinger reveals that many of the prices included are not auction prices, but prices of private transactions, reserve prices, estimates, and so on. We exclude all these non-auction prices. We then further investigate all remaining relevant entries, by cross-checking and potentially correcting the sale and price information in Reitlinger with a number of sources, such as the online art historical databases Lugt's Répertoire Online and the Getty Provenance Index. We also consult (often annotated) hard copies of the original auction catalogues in the National Art Library in London, or alternatively order them from online booksellers. We only include a potentially recordbreaking transaction in our list if it does not violate any of the criteria spelled out before, and if the available evidence allows us to determine the location and date of the auction, and the exact price paid.
We then review a number of additional historical auction sale reference works, to see whether there are any record sales between 1701 and 1960 not included in Reitlinger. We identify two records for the early 1700s (using an exchange rate of 11 guilders to the pound) in a collection of priced Dutch art For the period since the publication of Reitlinger's volume, our starting point is the online database Blouin Art Sales Index (BASI). We convert all prices to GBP and add the buyer's premium whenever necessary. One additional record-breaking post-1960 transaction not included in BASI, the 1961 sale of Rembrandt's "Aristotle with a bust of Homer", was identified based on a review of press articles on auction price records.
The above-described procedure results in a database of 35 art auction records between 1701 and end-2014. Table 2 shows for each record the date of sale, the price in GBP, the name of the artist, the title of the work, and the location of sale. Figure 2 shows the timing of records, and illustrates that records have mainly been clustered in three periods: the early 1800s, the 1910s and 1920s, and post-1950. The same figure also shows an index tracking the evolution of the standing record price in real GBP terms since 1701, an aggregate art price index since 1765 based on Goetzmann, Renneboog, and Spaenjers (2011) , and a number of macro-economic data series.
[Insert Table 2 and Figure 2 about here]
IV.2. Caveats
We need to stress that our list should not be considered as "the" list of records, but as "a" list of records, for three reasons. First, we believe that the criteria we used to identify records are sensible and of the auction in other data sources. More generally, for the first 250 years of our time frame, we need to base our analysis on a selective reading-it is infeasible to review all sales in all books covering the history of the art market-of the data that have survived. Third, there are a few items that may not entirely follow our own criteria. For example, it is unclear whether the 1804 Dou record should be considered as a buy-in, as "experts" involved in the sale pushed up the price and the work was eventually purchased by the auctioneer.
IV.3. Record prices for art at auction 1701−2014
For all transactions listed in Table 2 , we collect information on the identity of the seller and the circumstances of the sale, the identity of the buyer, the characteristics of the artwork, and the organization of the sale by the auction house. Sources that we consult include auction catalogues, notes on the transactions in the Getty Provenance Index and the different art market reference works mentioned before, books on the history of the art market, press articles and academic texts covering the record sales, and entries on the artworks in Wikipedia and on museum websites. We briefly describe the chronology of our list here, and add (rumoured) buyer identities to Table 2 , but a full description of all works and sales is beyond the scope of this paper.
The list starts with a string of eight records set between 1701 and 1811 by three seventeenth-century Dutch and Flemish masters: Gerard Dou (four times), Anthony Van Dyck (twice), and Rembrandt (twice). The high prices paid for Dou may nowadays be a surprise to many, but Reitlinger (1961) notes that "in 1771 a Gerard Dou was about the most expensive thing you could buy". According to Smith (1829 Smith ( -1842 , the Dou picture that set a record in 1771 (and which Reitlinger describes as "Picture in three wings") is the same as the first entry on our list. At the 1771 sale, the work was bought by an agent of Catherine the Great, but the ship that transported it sank on the way to Russia. Also the two Van Dyck sales of "Rest on the flight into Egypt" in 1713 and 1733 refer to one and the same painting.
In the 1713, it was the first lot in the sale of the collection of William III of England, who had died in 1702 (Jonckheere, 2004) . At the 1733 sale, it was bought for Sir Robert Walpole, but it would later move to Catherine the Great's collection. The 1808 Dou record is the last transaction in the Netherlands on our list. The next entry, the sale of Rembrandt's "Shipwright and his wife" in 1811 is the first of many record transactions at either Christie's or Sotheby's.
After 1811, our list shows a gap of more than four decades. In 1852, a painting by Murillo on the "Immaculate conception" was auctioned off as part of the estate sale of one of Napoleon's commanders, Marshal Soult, who had compiled an impressive art collection during the invasion of Spain. The work triggered a bidding war between the Louvre, the National Gallery, and the Tsar of Russia, and was ultimately auctioned off to the Louvre for 24,600 GPB, more than four times the price paid for Rembrandt's "Shipwright and his wife". (The painting has Only in 1957 did an auction price eclipse the 77,700 GBP paid for Lawrence's "Pinkie" in 1926. A still-life with apples by Gauguin was sold for 104,630 GBP at auction in Paris. In 1958, the Cezanne painting "Garçon au gilet rouge" was sold for more than double the previous record price. The work was the sixth lot in an auction of seven modern masterpieces; lots three (Manet) and four (Van Gogh) had already broken the Gauguin record. Yet, the record price was quickly exceeded by the sum paid for Rubens in 1959, and then for Rembrandt in 1961. The 817,052 GBP paid for Rembrandt's "Aristotle with a bust of Homer" in 1961 was more than three times more than the 275,000 GBP paid for Rubens two years before. In turn, the Rembrandt record was shattered in 1970, when 2.3 million GBP was paid for a Velasquez portrait. Both the Rembrandt and the Velasquez were acquired by the Metropolitan Museum.
In the 11 years from 1980 until 1990, our list shows nine records, which is as much as over the first two centuries of our sample. Of course, the art market boom in this period is well-known. The record went from 2.5 million GBP for one Van Gogh ("Le jardin du poète, Arles") in 1980 to 49 million GBP 
V. Understanding Art (Record) Prices
The timing of the records in our series is largely consistent with previous findings on the relation between macro-economic trends on the one hand and art prices on the other. For example, Figure 2 suggests that sharply decreasing wealth inequality (and trade openness) in the U.K. and the U.S. can help explaining the lack of records between 1926 and 1957, and that the fast succession of records over the last three-four decades is related to the strong growth in wealth worldwide. However, the records also illustrate the problem with a pure macro perspective. Even adjusting for the changes in taste through time, we see a decoupling of price from quality at the boundary. Not all the record-breaking works in Table 2 are regarded as the masterworks of the artists who created them, or can even be labeled as "unique" items. Moreover, record transactions do not always coincide with periods of price increases. For example, we observe no records during the second half of nineteenth century (when average prices increased sharply), while we see a number of records between 1910 and 1926 (when average prices plateaued).
We argue that auction price records are often set in situations characterized by one or more of the following elements: (i) extreme supply constraints, (ii) instances of social competition among "nouveaux riches", (iii) resolution of uncertainty about the potential resale value of the artwork, and (iv) idiosyncratic shifts from hedonic weights. In the following paragraphs, we will address each of these points, which illustrate the relevance of the micro perspective on art price formation advocated in Section III.
V.1. Supply constraints
One recurring feature in our series-especially for records set by Old Masters-is the presence of extreme supply constraints. Supply and volume at auction are affected by many factors: the original production by an artist, the collecting by long-lived institutions, financial shocks to collectors, and major disruptions and expropriations such as those that have occurred in twentieth-century Europe.
The low rate of return to art investment prior to 1960, for example, may have been due in part to the large volume of art that came to the market due to liquidity shocks around wars and recessions. By the same token, the transfer of masterworks into museums and more permanent collections in the post-war period may have increased scarcity and raised prices for a dwindling supply of sought-after works. The diminishing supply of high-quality works by Raphael surely contributed to the record price paid for a Raphael study in black chalk-according to the catalogue entry "an auxiliary cartoon"-in 1984. A year later, a news report on the acquisition of Mantegna's "Adoration of the Magi" said that "Mantegna paintings are rare, and very few are left in private hands" (Los Angeles Times, 1985) . Until three years before its record sale in 2004, Rubens' "Massacre of the innocents" was considered to be by one of his assistants or followers; the re-attribution turned it into one of the very few large-scale
paintings not yet in museums.
V.2. New wealth and the establishment of social recognition
The changes in the type of purchasers of our record pieces are informative. In the eighteenth and nineteenth century the buyers were mainly European monarchs and rulers. In the early twentieth Freud" from 32 to 8A just before the sale. Rumour had it that this was done because one of the interested Chinese collectors would only bid on the work if it had lot number 8 (Bloomberg, 2013) .
Apart from the importance of new money itself, our record series also clearly illustrates the role of social competition-often among "nouveaux riches"-in the determination of art prices at auction.
Indeed, some of the record prices materialized after a fierce bidding war between different parties. We give a few examples. First, in 1852, the Louvre, the National Gallery, and the Tsar of Russia fought for Murillo's "Immaculate conception". Jouin (1895) Frick-"get this picture at any price within reason" (Saltzman, 2009 ).
Third, and finally, in 1957, Gauguin's "Apples" sold for a record price in Paris after a bidding war between Greek shipping owners. The New Yorker reported "a sudden desire to acquire the canvas which ignited simultaneously in the bosom of Mr Goulandris and Mr Stavros Niarchos, causing an explosion of human nature that blew the roof off the international art market" (cited in Hook, 2009 ).
More generally, the transformation of auctions from dull wholesale trading sessions into glamorous high-society events has almost certainly contributed to the increase in competitive ambiance at auctions since the 1950s.
One distinctive feature of Figure 2 is the clustering of record events. It is not surprising to see that records were broken more frequently in nominal terms in the (second half of the) twentieth century, when inflation was higher, and barriers to global trade and capital flows decreased while global wealth sharply increased. However, the inter-arrival times between records within the twentieth century are clearly not random, as one would expect from a stationary Poisson process. The clustering of records-in practice sometimes even within a single auction (cf. supra)-suggests temporal dependency. One conjecture is that the inter-temporal clustering may indicate competitive bidding with respect to how much wealthy collectors are willing to pay for major works of art-regardless of the specific characteristics of the artwork. The setting of a record itself may induce rival collectors to set a record. This may also explain the unremarkable nature of some of the record-setting works.
V.3. Resolution of uncertainty about the resale value
Our record series includes a number of works of which multiple versions or editions exist, and that can thus not necessarily be described as "unique". Also the frequent succession of records by the same artist in short time periods, at least over the last few decades, can be linked not only to idiosyncratic changes in the demand for "consumption" of the artist's work, or to social competition, but also to the idea of resolution of uncertainty about the resale value. In such a view, the increased propensity of art owners to sell after increases in price levels could have contributed to the clustering of records-both on a market-wide and on an artist-specific levelover time.
V.4. Idiosyncratic shifts from hedonic weights
Even taking into account the above factors, it is difficult to comprehend record prices for a study in black chalk (even if it is by Raphael), for a Giacometti statue of which six editions and four artist proofs exist (and that realized a price about four times the pre-sale estimate), or for George Romney and Thomas Lawrence portraits, without relying on idiosyncratic shifts from hedonic preferences.
Clearly, hedonic models only capture "average" preferences as shown by all available historical transactions, and deviations from these average correlations between artwork characteristics and prices can be important in practice.
VI. Conclusion
A growing literature in economics has substantially improved our knowledge of the risk-return properties of diversified art portfolios, the correlation patterns between artwork characteristics and prices, and the impact of shifts in income and wealth distributions-and in sentiment-on average art
prices. Yet, the aggregate time-series dynamics and average cross-sectional pricing differences hide a lot of underlying variation. 28 We argue that, to further increase the economic understanding of the market for aesthetics, we need to examine the formation of art prices on a disaggregate level. Each individual artwork gives rise to a market for trading in its private-value benefits. Within this framework, we discuss recent theoretical and empirical studies on the different forces driving the willingness to pay of bidders at art auctions.
Emerging conclusions of this new body of work are that the enjoyment associated with art ownership is multi-faceted, that preferences interact with wealth in determining the magnitude of private values, that beliefs about resale revenues affect auction outcomes, and that auction house strategies matter.
We then illustrate the relevance of a micro perspective on the formation of art prices through a particular case study. Based on historical research, we identify 35 sales of artworks between 1701 and 2014 that set price records (in nominal GBP terms) at auction. We conclude that auction price records are often set in situations characterized by one or more of the following elements: (i) extreme supply constraints, (ii) instances of social competition among "nouveaux riches", (iii) resolution of uncertainty about the potential resale value of the artwork, and (iv) idiosyncratic shifts from hedonic weights. and Dimson (1979) betas with respect to real equity returns, real GDP per capita growth rates, and inflation, estimated using same-year and lagged independent variables.
The data for art come from Goetzmann, Renneboog, and Spaenjers (2011) and Artprice.com (2014) . The data for equities, bonds, bills, and inflation come from Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2002, 2014 Table 2 shows the record-breaking art auctions identified in this paper. For each record transaction, the table gives the year of sale, the price in GBP including buyer's premium, the artist name, the title of the work, the location of the sale, and the (rumoured) buyer. The data for art come from Goetzmann, Renneboog, and Spaenjers (2011) and Artprice.com (2014) . The data for equities, bonds, bills, and inflation come from Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2002, 2014) . Each index is set equal to 100 at the beginning of 1900.
Figure 2. Art Auction Records and the Macro-Economy 1700-2013
The vertical lines in Figure 2 show the timing of art auctions records over the period 1700-2013. Figure 2 also shows an index tracking the record price level, an aggregate art price index (linked to the record price index in 1765), and a U.K. equity price index, all in deflated GBP terms, against the left axis, and U.K. inflation, the share of wealth held by the top percentile in the U.K., and a measure of openness to trade, in percentage terms, against the right axis. Data on inflation come from Clark (2014). The data for art come from Goetzmann, Renneboog, and Spaenjers (2011) and Artprice.com (2014) . Data on equities come from Global Financial Data and Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2002, 2014) . Wealth share data come from Ohlsson, Roine, and Waldenström (2008) and Piketty (2013) . Data on exports, imports, and GDP come from Hills, Thomas, and Dimsdale (2010) .
